We develop ‡exible semiparametric time series methods that are then used to assess the causal e¤ect of monetary policy interventions on macroeconomic aggregates. Our estimator captures the average causal response to discrete policy interventions in a macro-dynamic setting, without the need for assumptions about the process generating macroeconomic outcomes. The proposed procedure, based on propensity score weighting, easily accommodates asymmetric and nonlinear responses. Application of this estimator to the e¤ects of monetary restraint shows the Fed to be an e¤ective in ‡ation …ghter.
Introduction
The string metaphor is an enduring feature of the debate over monetary policy: increasing borrowing costs may reliably slow an expansion, but cheap capital need not stimulate investment in a downturn.
What does the historical record say regarding the possibly di¤erent macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary contraction and expansion? As many have recognized, this question is easy to ask but hard to answer.
As Cochrane (1994) and Romer and Romer (2013) remind us, since the creation of the Federal Reserve, central bankers have struggled to understand the limits of their power. The identi…cation challenge in this context arises from the fact that policy changes are rarely isolated from other economically important developments, including, perhaps, anticipated changes in economic conditions. If these changes are related to the outcome variables of interest, one subset of time series observations likely provides a poor control for another.
Many contemporary investigations of macro policy rely on structural models of economic behavior to solve this fundamental identi…cation problem (see, for example, the survey by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin, 2011) . This approach, typically cast in a dynamic structural general equilibrium (DSGE) framework, begins with a model of the macroeconomy that is meant to mimic the time series behavior of key macro variables. In addition to theoretical predictions, DSGE models generate a system of linear (or linearized) di¤erence equations that provide the basis for empirical work. These equations can be interpreted as vector autoregressions (VARs) with an associated set of coe¢ cient or error-covariance restrictions (as in Bagliano and Favero, 1998; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999 ; and many others).
The heart of the DSGE approach uses a model of the entire economy to isolate shocks that identify causal policy e¤ects. The validity of the resulting causal inferences therefore turns in part on how accurately economic models describe the macroeconomy.
An alternative strategy, inspired by the landmark Friedman and Schwartz (1963) volume, tries to identify policy shocks through a close reading of the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes. Romer and Romer (1989) is the …rst in a series of in ‡uential contemporary studies in this mold. A drawback of the narrative approach is the subjective manner in which shocks are identi…ed.
Moreover, some of the putatively random policy shifts identi…ed in Romer and Romer (1989) may be correlated with economic variables (an argument ‡eshed out in Hoover and Pérez, 1994 ; see Romer and Romer, 1994 for a rebuttal). This paper outlines a new route to causal inference for monetary policy e¤ects, sidestepping some of the di¢ culties encountered in structural and narrative-based e¤orts. The de…ning feature of our approach is a laser-like focus on the policy-making process. In contrast with the narrative approach, which also focuses on Fed decision-making, our analysis of Fed behavior is more formal and data-driven.
Our solution to the policy evaluation problem starts with the presumption that, conditional on marketderived statistics that embed optimal forecasts of future outcomes and anticipated policy moves, along with a small set of institutional and economic variables, policy variation can be used to identify causal e¤ects. This assumption allows us to quantify the causal e¤ect of policy changes in an environment of stable expectations and goals. At the same time, our empirical strategy easily accommodates nonlinear e¤ects, while distinguishing the e¤ects of monetary easing from those of tightening.
The selection-on-observables framework outlined here is founded on strong identifying assumptions, but also provides a natural starting point for time series causal inference. In the absence of purposefully designed experiments or naturally occurring quasi-experimental shifts, it's hard to see how one can do better than to use the policy variation at hand. Our focused approach limits the task of model speci…cation and robustness checking to the formulation and testing of a model of the policy determination process.
The selection-on-observables assumption also buys us strong testable restrictions that can be used to assess the plausibility of causal claims. The principal econometric question that arises in our context is how to exploit selection-on-observables identi…cation in a manner that imposes minimal auxiliary assumptions and facilitates speci…cation testing.
Our econometric policy model describes the probability of federal funds rate target changes conditional on market statistics, past policy choices, lagged outcomes, and a few other controls. The resulting set of conditional distributions de…nes a function we call the policy propensity score. Monetary policy rules have long been studied in macroeconomics; see, for example, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) , Woodford (2001) and Galí and Gertler (2007) for recent contributions. Propensity score methods, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , have proven useful for cross-sectional causal inference (see, e.g., Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd(1998) ). In a pair of papers closely related to this one, Kuersteiner (2004, 2011) , adapt the propensity score framework to the problem of time series causality testing of the sort discussed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) . We extend this framework here, deriving ‡exible, easy-to-compute propensity score estimators of the causal e¤ects of a dynamic multinomial treatment. These semiparametric estimators are then used to assess the impact of monetary policy before and since the Great Recession. The main payo¤ to our approach is the ability to go directly from the policy process to causal e¤ects on outcomes. The resulting causal estimates are valid for all processes generating outcomes, nonlinear and complex as they might be, while allowing distinct assessments of the impact of tight and easy money.
The …rst task on our empirical agenda is the construction of a credible model for the policy propensity score. To that end, we follow Kuttner (2001) , Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004) , and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) in using market-based measures of anticipated policy. Speci…cally, we rely on Piazzesi's (2005) model linking Federal Reserve policy actions with asset prices. This link is used to justify a model for target rate changes as a function of the price of federal funds rate futures contracts. Market-based predictions of policy actions provide a low-dimension aggregator of publicly available information. This in turn leads to parsimonious policy models well suited to a data-poor time series setting.
Our investigation of monetary policy e¤ects replicates …ndings from earlier work while uncovering some that are new. Echoing the …ndings of Evans (1996, 1999) ), among others, our results suggest contractionary monetary policy slows real economic activity, reducing employment as well as in ‡ation. At the same time, in contrast with a number of earlier studies (such as those reviewed in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999) , the semiparametric estimation strategy developed here suggests Fed e¤orts to support the real economy have been disappointing. The ease with which this asymmetric response is revealed is an attractive feature of our approach. Finally, motivated by interest in the Fed's attempts to stimulate the economy during the Great Recession, we compare responses calculated using a sample that ends in mid-2005 with results from a sample running through 2008, when the federal funds target rate hit zero. We also compute estimates for the latter period only. Our conclusions regarding the Fed's limited ability to boost real economic activity stand under both variations.
Potential Outcomes and Macro Causal E¤ects

Conceptual Framework
The economy is described by the vector, t = (x 0 t ; y 0 t ; D 0 t ) 0 ; where y t is a k y -vector of outcome variables, D t is a vector of policy variables that takes on values d 0 ; :::; d J , and x t is a vector of contemporaneous covariates.
Policy is determined by lagged economic conditions, lagged policy choices, and covariates; combined in the vector
The policy regime is indexed by a parameter, , which takes values in a parameter space : In addition, policymakers are assumed to react to idiosyncratic information or taste variables, represented by the scalar " t , that we don't get to see. The realized policy D t is determined by both observed and unobserved variables according to D t = D(z t ; ; " t ). For identi…cation purposes, we assume that " t is independent of potential outcomes. This is reminiscent of the recursive ordering proposed by Evans (1996, 1999) , but our approach requires no description of the structural process connecting y t with policy choices or expected future values of t :
Our framework for causal inference builds on the notion of potential outcomes. Potential outcomes describe realizations of y t that arise in response to a hypothetical change in monetary policy. The potential outcomes concept originated in experimental studies where the investigator has control over the assignment of treatments, but is now widely used in observational studies. Although potential outcomes most commonly appear in studies looking at the causal e¤ects of a binary treatment or policy intervention, the idea is easily extended to ordered discrete or continuous interventions (see, e.g., Angrist and Imbens, 1995) .
The de…nition of potential outcomes used here comes from Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) : In a macroeconomic context, potential outcomes can be generated by a DSGE structure. Suppose, as in Cochrane (1994) , that output is determined by
where the a are parameters and t is an i.i.d. shock (The mapping between a and may be obtained by linearizing a non-linear DSGE model.). Cochrane's monetary policy rule is given by
The resulting moving average representation for y t can be written
Here, c y";j is the impulse response function for output in response to policy shocks. Suppose, that instead of the realized policy, D t is set to d j . The potential outcome induced by this manipulation is:
This tell us what we can expect to see in response to such a change, in a world where the path of shocks is otherwise unchanged. The associated causal e¤ect of this policy change is
. Thus, causal e¤ects in our framework match those determined by a VAR in a linear, constant-e¤ects world.
Individual causal e¤ects can never be observed since the real world gives us on only one realization. We 
Average policy e¤ects are given by describes an average generalized impulse response function for all possible policy choices. In contrast with traditional impulse response analyses in empirical macro, however, the impulse response function estimated here can be both asymmetric and nonlinear.
Potential outcomes for counterfactual policy choices are unobserved, so the expectation in (5) cannot be estimated directly. The variation that identi…es causal relationships in our framework is characterized by a conditional independence assumption, also known as selection on observables:
Condition 1 Selection on observables: In Cochrane's example, the policy function, indexed by , a¤ects the impulse response parameters, c y" , through the parameter a Dy : Cochrane (1994) shows that c y" may change as fed behavior changes.
Our conditional independence assumption focuses on variation in policy interventions while holding the policy regime …xed, after conditioning on observables, z t . Leeper and Zha's (2003) notion of modest policy interventions captures the same idea. In the simple model described by (1) and (2), selection on observables requires serially independent " t , independent of t .
Using Equation (4) and Condition 1, we can write the average policy e¤ect conditional on z t in terms of observable distributions as:
Although cast in terms of in-principle observable conditional means, in applications with a high-dimensional conditioning set involving continuous random variables, estimation of these conditional expectations is empirically demanding. The estimation problem is simpli…ed by use of a parametric model for the policy function. Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) call this model the policy propensity score.
The policy propensity score is P (D t = d j jz t ) = p j (z t ; ) ; where p j (z t ; ) is a ‡exible parametric model with parameters determined by the policy regime. Average causal e¤ects can then be estimated using the fact that Condition 1 implies
and integrating over z t allows us to write
This weighting scheme was …rst used to estimate population means in non-random samples by Horvitz and Thompson (1952) and adapted for causal inference with cross-sectional Bernoulli treatments by Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003) . In cross-sectional studies of causal e¤ects of Bernoulli interventions, (8) is known as an average treatment e¤ ect. Our setup allows for multinomial or ordered treatments. 1 The estimand described by (8) is similar to that approximated using local linear projections in Jordà (2005), though here no approximation is required. The estimand can also be related to the nonlinear impulse response function introduced by Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993 
Estimation
Inverse probability weighting estimators can be written as simple weighted averages of the vector of future outcomes Y t;L = y 0 t+1 ; ::; y 0 t+L 0 , with weights formed from:
In a correctly speci…ed model, these weights have mean zero and are uncorrelated with z t . To ensure this is true in …nite samples and under possible misspeci…cation, we weight with the residuals from a regression of t;j ^ on z t and a constant. This produces the weighting function,ĥ t = Y t;L t;j ^ ^ t;j , where^ t;j is the relevant …tted value. The average causal response vector is then estimated as the sample
The estimator^ solveŝ
a minimum distance objective function. Given this problem has an equal number of parameters and moment conditions, the choice of leaves the solution to (10) una¤ected. Sometimes, however, it's interesting to restrict : For example, to facilitate comparisons with VAR's, symmetric responses can be estimated by assuming that the e¤ect of d j and d j are of the same magnitude but opposite in sign.
More generally, we estimate under restrictions = ( ), where is a reduced set of free parameters, by
The optimal for this over-identi…ed scenario is the spectral density matrix ofĥ t at zero frequency, which can be estimated as detailed in Newey and West (1994) . Asymptotic approximations to the sampling distribution of^ or^ account for the fact that is estimated in a …rst stage. The relevant limiting distributions for estimators and test statistics are derived in the appendix.
A Propensity Score for Monetary Policy Interventions
The federal funds market is an interbank loan market intended for the management of reserve requirements; the rate for overnight loans in this market, known as the federal funds rate, provides a benchmark for securities across the risk and maturity spectrum. Monetary policy targeted the level of the federal funds rate until mid-December, 2008, when the fed funds rate was set to trade between 0 and 0.25%.
With no room to lower rates further, the Fed turned to other tools, such as large scale asset purchases.
We focus here on the pre-2009 policy era, going back to July 1989. Because FOMC meetings are very nearly a monthly occurrence, we work with monthly data.
3. The space of possible policy choices is de…ned here to be {-0.50%, -0.25%, 0%, 0.25%, 0.50% }, where the 0.50% events include the larger changes.
Our sample is determined in part by the availability of policy predictors derived from …nancial derivatives based on the federal funds rate. One such derivative, federal funds rate futures ( an additional 24 months ending in December 2010 used to estimate policy responses. Finally, we also experiment separately with data from the Great Recession period only. This is a small sample and it imposes some limits to the experiments we can conduct that we will discuss below.
Policy Predictors for the Propensity Score
E¢ cient markets price futures contracts using all available information. This motivates students of monetary policy to de…ne policy shocks as deviations from the optimal predictions implicit in asset prices. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) , for example, use changes in the Eurodollar rate around meeting dates to de…ne target rate surprises, while Thapar (2008) Federal funds rate derivatives include a futures contract on the e¤ective federal funds rate and an options contract on these futures (though the latter started only in 2003). Futures contracts refer to calendar-month averages of the e¤ective federal funds rate published by the New York Fed, with spot, and one-through …ve-month contracts. We use these derivatives to predict target changes, implicitly de…ning policy surprises as deviations from market-based forecasts of Federal Reserve behavior.
The intuitive notion that futures prices provide an optimal policy forecast can be made rigorous using Piazzesi's (2005) term structure model. Denote the information available to policy makers at time t by t . Piazzesi shows that bond yields and related derivatives likewise depend on t . Under the additional assumption that pricing functions are invertible, we can replace t ; which may be only partially observable, with a vector of observed asset prices z t . This theoretical argument is ‡eshed out in the appendix.
As a practical matter, our analysis distinguishes between months with scheduled FOMC meetings ("meeting months") and months without. In meeting months, we construct s 1 t , the di¤erence between the price of the futures contract expiring during the same month as the meeting and the current target rate, both observed at market close on the day before the meeting. In non-meeting months, we construct s 0 t , the di¤erence between the price of a one-month-ahead contract in that month and the target rate in e¤ect on the last day of the previous month.
With a few exceptions, our predictor for meeting months is s 1 t , while in non-meeting months, s 0 t is used. In constructing s 1 t for months in the pre-1994 era, before target rate changes were announced, our coded announcement date is delayed by one day relative to the later period. Before 1994, the market became aware of a target change only through a reading of the open market operations implemented by the New York Fed's Trading Desk. These operations take place at the beginning of the trading day and hence are observed the day after a meeting, which generally concludes after the close of the market. This nuance a¤ects the construction of s 1 t only. In a few instances, target rate changes in meeting months preceded meetings, with an additional change or no change at the meeting, as in February, March, and August 1991. In such situations, the predictor is taken to be s 0 t rather than s 1 t and enters as its own covariate. The active futures variable for any given month is denoted F F F t , equal to either s 0 t or s 1 t , as described above. Because target changes are naturally ordered in 0.25% increments over the range 0:50%, we model the policy propensity score with an ordered probit speci…cation. Hamilton and Jordà (2002) and Scotti (2011) likewise use ordered probit to model federal funds rate target changes. The dependent variable is the change in the target rate during month m + 1; irrespective of whether an FOMC meeting was announced or whether the target was changed. For the few occasions where more than one target change occurred in the same month, recall that we use the accumulated monthly change.
We allow the coe¢ cients of the propensity score to vary after August 2006 to capture a window that includes the …nancial crisis with about a one year lead time. 5 Since there were no instances of changes prior to meetings after 2001, the predictor for that scenario only enters in the pre-crisis data.
In addition to controlling for market expectations through fed funds futures prices, we include and the unemployment rate, such as might appear in a conventional monetary policy rule. The unemployment rate is available at a monthly frequency and is a natural substitute for output gap measures commonly used with quarterly data. Moreover, our "Taylor Rule" speci…cation can be motivated by results of Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Galí (2011) who show that the optimal monetary policy rule in a New Keynesian model with real-wage rigidities depends both on in ‡ation and unemployment. Finally, the speci…cation of the propensity score includes a number of terms designed to capture a variety of calendar e¤ects. These include a dummy variable FOMC t indicating months with a scheduled FOMC meeting, the target change in the previous month, the target rate change in the previous month interacted with FOMC, a scale factor that accounts for when within the month the FOMC meeting is scheduled, and a set of monthly seasonal dummies. We also include the variable CRISIS t , a dummy that takes the value Estimates of a benchmark Taylor-type speci…cation that predicts target rate changes with in ‡ation and unemployment alone are reported in columns (1) and (2). These are labeled OP T 1 and OP T 2 and use the pre-crisis sample. Columns (5) and (6), report estimates for OP T 1 and OP T 2 using the full sample.
Broadly speaking, the estimates show that both variables a¤ect policy largely as expected, though the negative unemployment e¤ect is stronger than the very small positive in ‡ation e¤ect. The latter is not statistically signi…cant. The Taylor model estimates shown in columns (1) and (5) (labeled OP T 1 ) use same-month measures only, while the estimates reported in columns (2) and (6) (labeled OP T 2 ) are from models that add in ‡ation and unemployment lags, the size of the last target change, and seasonal and scheduling dummies. 7 5 The last target increase is dated June 2006. August 2007 marks the …rst in a sequence of target reductions that extend to the end of the sample. 6 The scale factor is de…ned as = ( t) where is the number of days in a given month and t is the day of the month when the FOMC meeting is scheduled.
7 Detailed variable de…nitions and sources appear in Appendix B.
Columns (3) and (4) for the short sample and columns (7) and (8) for the long sample, labeled OP F 1 and OP F 2 report estimates from speci…cations that include F F F t terms that di¤er in meeting and nonmeeting months, and in the pre-crisis and full samples. The results indicate that market-based factors are better predictors of target rate changes than the combination of in ‡ation and unemployment and their lags in a Taylor speci…cation. The pseudo-R 2 s in columns (3) and (7) (OP F 1 ), based on estimates of the policy propensity score using these factors but excluding in ‡ation and unemployment terms are virtually identical to the pseudo-R 2 s from the speci…cations augmented with these Taylor model terms and reported in columns (4) and (8) (OP F 2 ). Neither in ‡ation nor unemployment marginal e¤ects are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero when estimated in the more elaborate models.
Fitted values from the full policy score model (8) seem to track realized shifts well over the course of the business cycle. This can be seen in Figure 1 , which plots actual and predicted target changes (i.e., the expected target change conditional on regressors in the policy propensity score). Predictions were computed using the OP F 2C estimates from column (8) of Table 1 . The …gure also shows the time series of Industrial Production (IP) growth to mark cyclical ‡uctuations.
An important diagnostic for our purposes looks at whether lagged macro aggregates are independent of policy changes conditional on the policy propensity score. In other words we would like to show that the policy shocks implicitly de…ned by our score model look to be "as good as randomly assigned".
Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) develop semiparametric tests that can be used for this purpose. Panel A of Table 2 reports test results for the null hypothesis of orthogonality between the policy innovation, 
Dynamic Policy E¤ects
The yield curve is the proximate channel through which target rate changes a¤ect in ‡ation and the real economy. We therefore begin with an analysis of policy e¤ects on the yield curve, speci…cally, the federal funds, 3-month T-Bill, and 2-and 10-year T-Bond rates. In addition to the yield curve, we look at e¤ects on in ‡ation measured by the change in 100 times the log of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the response in the change of 100 times the log of the Industrial Production (IP) index, and the response in the change of the unemployment rate. Policy responses refer to the percentage point change in the outcome variable measured from the month of the policy intervention out to the relevant horizon.
Our analysis shows the impact of 25 basis point changes, up and down, out to a horizon of 24 months.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 plot these estimated responses, constructed using propensity score model OP F 2=C in columns (4) and (8) of Table 1 . The …gures also show 90% con…dence bands.
The federal funds rate responds more sharply to increases in the target rate than to decreases, as can be seen in Figure 2 A 25 basis point (bps) increase in the target appears to spark a sequence of further changes that induces a peak increase in the federal funds rate close to 1 percentage point (pp) after about a year, then falling to half a percentage point after two years. This pattern is similar to that found in VAR-type estimates (e.g., Figure 3 in Christiano et al. 1999, when cumulated) . By contrast, a 25 bps reduction lowers the federal funds rate by -0.50 pp one year out, a decline that's sustained after two years.
Estimated causal e¤ects of a change in target yields are shown in Figure 3 . As we might expect, rate increases move through the yield curve with diminished intensity as maturities lengthen. A similar pattern appears in estimates reported by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) . The estimated yield curve response to a rate decrease goes the other way and is somewhat more muted, as can be seen in the right-hand column of the …gure. This relatively ‡at response is consistent with the ‡atter response of the federal funds rate in the bottom of Figure 2 . The relative insensitivity of the yield curve to target rate decreases provides a possible explanation for weak transmission of accommodative monetary policy changes to macro aggregates.
Responses of macroeconomic aggregates to monetary policy changes appear in Figure 4 . The top row displays the responses of the change in 100 times the log of the price level; the second row reports e¤ects on 100 times the change in the log of IP; the third row shows e¤ects on the change in the unemployment rate. Target rate increases begin to reduce in ‡ation after about 18 months. After two years, a quarter point increase in the target is estimated to have reduced prices by about a quarter point, equivalent to a reduction of just over a tenth of a point in the annual in ‡ation rate. Interestingly, these results show no evidence of a "price puzzle," that is, a short-run increase in in ‡ation when rates rise. The price puzzle is a common …nding in VAR-based estimates of the e¤ects of monetary shocks (see, e.g., Sims, 1992) Industrial Production is largely invariant to a rate increase in the …rst post-change year, but then falls to a net decline of about 1.5 pps after two years. This is roughly a 0.75 pp decrease in annual growth rates. The unemployment rate response essentially mirrors this, with a total increase of about a quarter point after two years. Estimated responses of IP and the unemployment rate to target rate reductions emerge only slowly and are modest when they do. This di¤erence, documented in the right-hand column of Figure 3 , seems likely to re ‡ect the relatively muted response of the federal funds rate and the yield curve to reductions in the target rate. Although the e¤ect of target rate changes is about equal, up or down, when looking two years out, the fed funds rate and yield curve are markedly more sensitive to rate increases than to rate decreases at intermediate horizons. Di¤erences in the responses to up and down changes therefore seem likely to re ‡ect a weaker "…rst stage" for the policy intervention, though we can't rule out di¤erences in policy sensitivity on the upside and downside as well. This strong asymmetry in yield curve and macro aggregate responses to US monetary policy shifts echoes …ndings in Hamilton and Jordà (2002) and Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) , but does not feature in most VAR-based estimates.
Other Comparisons and Context
In an in ‡uential study of the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on the yield curve and macro variables, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) report estimates of policy e¤ects on the yield curve similar to ours. On the other had, their results show little e¤ect of policy changes on prices, while suggesting employment increases after a rate increase. The yield curve e¤ects reported here are stronger than the VAR-based responses reported in Evans (1996, 1999) . As a theoretical matter, monetary models with nominal rigidities, information asymmetries, menu costs, or lending constraints typically imply asymmetric responses to monetary policy interventions. For example, Cover (1992) and DeLong and Summers (1988) argue that contractionary monetary policy a¤ects real variables more than expansionary policy does. Using international data, Karras (1996) …nds strong evidence of asymmetry in the e¤ects of monetary policy on output using European data. These papers are consistent with Keynes'(1936) observations on the role of sticky wages in business cycles (see Ravn and Sola, 2004 for a recent review of the relevant history of thought in this context). full-sample analysis as we limit the horizon to 12 months for the crisis sample). Figure 5 shows the estimated response of the federal funds rate in the longer sample (the …rst of our two experiments). These estimates are similar to those shown in Figure 2 , with the response to a target increase peaking slightly above 1 pp after 18 months, falling to a little over half a point two years out.
Crisis Intervention
The estimated response to a target decrease is slightly less persistent than in the shorter sample, ending the two-year horizon with a decline of only a quarter point rather than a half.
Estimated term rate responses are plotted in Figure 6 . These show a slightly sharper yield curve response to rate increases, while the response to target rate reductions is, if anything, even more muted than that for the pre-crisis sample. The estimated e¤ects in panels on the right hand side of Figure 6 are remarkably ‡at, consistent with the ‡atter response of the fed funds rate to target rate declines plotted in Figure 5 .
Macro aggregate responses in the longer sample, reported in Figure 7 , show little e¤ect of a target rate change on in ‡ation. Estimated e¤ects of rate increases on IP suggest less of a decline in response to rate increases than that estimated for the short sample, with a decline of just over 1 pp after two years (versus 1.5 pps in the shorter sample). The unemployment rate response to a rate increase is also somewhat smaller than that found in the shorter sample, while target rate declines are again estimated to have little e¤ect on any macro aggregate.
Our short "crisis sample" saw no target rate increases, so the analysis of this sample models policy changes as any rate decrease of 25 bps or more. The policy propensity score used for this is a probit function of the combined futures variable, along with in ‡ation and unemployment (the Taylor variables used for the policy model estimated in the longer sample). The resulting marginal e¤ects, reported in Table 3 , are normalized to show the impact on the probability the target rate is left unchanged, so the signs align with the ordered estimates reported earlier. As with the ordered score model, column (3) in Table 3 shows FFF to be a strong predictor of target rate changes. Though the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation is marginally signi…cant (and wrong-signed) in column (3), overall, in ‡ation and unemployment add little to policy prediction conditional on FFF, a …nding that emerges by comparing the log likelihood in columns (2) and (3). The F -statistic is 1.98 with a p-value of 0.14. Finally, a model with in ‡ation and unemployment alone does not predict target rate decreases as well as a model with only FFF, as can be seen in a comparison of likelihoods across columns (1) and (2). In fact, in the short crisis sample, traditional Taylor Rule variables are essentially unrelated to target rate declines. The F -statistic between columns (1) and (3) is 14.52 with a p-value of nearly 0, suggesting that the term FFF is doing the heavy lifting. Figure 8 shows the estimated response of the federal funds rate to target rate changes using only the crisis period. The results show large but highly imprecisely estimated declines in the federal funds rate. Part of the increase in magnitude here may be due to the fact that the policy dummy in this case indicates a combination of quarter-point and half-point declines.
Figure 9 plots term rate responses to policy interventions in the crisis sample. The estimates o¤er some evidence that federal funds rate declines are passed down the yield curve in the form of a pattern reasonably consistent with that found when estimated using more data. Finally, Figure 10 reports the responses of the macro variables. Here too the estimates are imprecise. Although inconclusive, they o¤er little support for the view that monetary stimulus was e¤ective in the crisis period.
Summary and Conclusions
We start with the assumption that policy changes are independent of potential outcomes, conditional on observed market-based forecasts of these changes plus a small set of economic predictors. Selection-onobservables is a strong assumption, but a natural starting point. We then consider how best to make use of the selection-on-observables identi…cation condition in a potential outcomes framework. The resulting propensity score weighting estimator captures possibly nonlinear and asymmetric causal responses to an ordered dynamic treatment through a simple reweighting procedure. Our framework focuses modeling e¤ort and speci…cation testing on the process that determines policy decision; the model for outcomes is left unspeci…ed.
Our propensity score weighting estimator for ordered time series treatments is applied to evaluate the e¤ect of monetary policy interventions on macroeconomic outcomes before and during the Great Recession. Results for the pre-recession period suggest an asymmetric response to changes in the fed funds rate target, much as implied by the string metaphor. Our …ndings suggest that target rate increases reduce in ‡ation, employment and output. At the same time, target decreases appear to have little e¤ect on output or in ‡ation. Perhaps surprisingly, an extension of our analysis to cover the "zero lower bound years" since 2008 leaves these …ndings essentially unchanged.
What explains the asymmetric response of macro aggregates to monetary policy interventions? An important …nding emerging from the analysis reported here is the weak e¤ect of target rate declines on medium and long term bond rates. Because changes in these rates provide a plausible causal channel for policy, the relative unresponsiveness of these bond rates to policy may account for much of the weak impact of target rate reductions on macro aggregates. At the same time, the limited precision of many of our estimates means we can't rule out di¤erential sensitivity of macro aggregates to bond yield declines and hikes. In view of this constellation of …ndings, suggesting though not establishing a "weak channels" hypothesis for asymmetric policy e¤ects, in future work, we plan to use the econometric methods developed here to analyze the e¤ects of the Fed's recent large scale asset purchases. These interventions were designed to reduce the long end of the yield curve in the face of exceptionally low short-term rates.
A Asset Price Based Policy Predictions
Our formulation of the propensity score is based on Piazzesi's (2005) we can recover t with a vector of asset prices. This is particularly appealing because some of the elements in t may not be directly observable.
We rely on a no-arbitrage pricing relationship between the price of zero coupon bonds as well as a federal funds futures contract and the state vector t : Let the state price density M t be such that the price at time t of a random payo¤ V at time
is the expectation operator with respect to the risk neural measure. Harrison and Kreps (1979) show that the existence of a state price density is essentially equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium price system, something we impose as an assumption. Using the risk neutral measure, random payo¤s at various maturities are priced as
We assume that the relationship between the state vector t and (12) is invertible, an assumption that is satis…ed for example in a¢ ne models. Let z t = P V 1 (t; T 1 j t ) ; :::; P Vq (t; T q j t ) be a vector of observed price data with maturities T 1 ; ::; T q and assume that the pricing function has an inverse g such that t = g (z t ; t; T 1 ; :::; T q ) :
The technique of inverting the yield curve to elicit unobservable state variables is well established in the …nancial econometrics literature -see Söderlind and Svensson (1997) , Singleton (2001) or Piazzesi (2005) for examples. Our empirical model for the propensity score is related to the policy function by p j (z t ; ) := p j (g (z t ; t; T 1 ; :::; T q ) ; ) :
Federal funds futures maturing shortly after FOMC announcements are probably good candidates for z t .
The reason is that there is a direct link between their expected future cash ‡ow and changes in the federal funds target rate. We focus on the case where no FOMC meeting is announced. Because macroeconomic data is released at di¤erent days throughout the month and because we are interested in good predictors of expected Fed policy for the entire month m + 1, we concentrate our attention on the futures price on the last day of the prior month m; that is, t m : Let f 1 tm;m denote the price of a one-month ahead contract traded at the last day of month m and let m be the total number of days in month m. On any given day t j in month m + 1, let r t j be the e¤ective federal funds rate at the close of the market. 8 The payo¤ for a buyer of a fed funds futures contract is the di¤erence between the futures rate f 1 t;m and the average fed funds rate over month m + 1;
with the payo¤ cash settled the day after expiration of the futures contract (see Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008, p. 679) . Pricing equation (12) and (15) imply that the spread between a funds future f 1 tm;m and the prevailing target rate r tm at the last day t m of month m is
r tm j tm P 1 t m ; t m+1 j tm (16) where t m+1 denotes the end of month m + 1 and P 1 t m ; t m+1 j tm is the t m price of a zero coupon bond maturing at t m+1 . Note that f 1 tm;m re ‡ects both uncertainty about whether and when a target rate change will occur in month m+1 and more general uncertainty about the economy captured by the pricing kernel M t : Equation (16) shows that the futures-target rate spread is the best risk adjusted predictor of a target rate change during the coming month. 9 Whether (16) can be inverted to recover tm as in (13) 
B.2 Standard Errors
The estimator^ de…ned in (11) is computed in two steps. First, the unconstrained estimate^ = T 1 P T t=1ĥ t is obtained. Let be the asymptotic covariance matrix of^ : Assume that^ is a consistent estimator of : Now, the estimator^ is given aŝ
Replacing with^ has no e¤ect on the …rst order asymptotic distribution of^ under our assumptions.
On the other hand, the limiting distributions of^ ; (^ ) and^ ; derived in Theorems 1 and 2 in Appendix B.5, depend on a preliminary estimate of the the propensity score with parameters . Assume^ is the maximum likelihood estimator with representation
where
is the score of the maximum likelihood estimator. The representation in (17) is used to expandĥ t
The covariance matrix is the typical spectrum at frequency zero matrix of v t ( 0 ) found in the HAC-standard error literature (see Newey and West (1994) ) and is given by
The formula for takes into account that the 'observations'ĥ t used to compute the sample averages are based on estimated, rather than observed data. Con…dence intervals for can be constructed from :
We estimate from the sample averages
As in Newey and West (1994) , we use the Bartlett kernel with prewhitening and a data-dependent plug in estimator to obtain the necessary bandwidth parameter.
The Newey and West procedure is implemented as follows. Prewhitening is achieved by …tting a VAR(1) model to v t ^ : For this purpose de…ne the autoregressive parameter estimatê
for j = 0 and ;j =^ 0 ; j for j < 0: Let 1 = [1; :::; 1] 0 be an r-dimensional vector where r is the dimension of : De…nê The estimator for is now de…ned aŝ
B.3 Speci…cation Tests
The speci…cation tests are based on the following fact. If w t is a vector of elements of z t or t 1 ; then correct speci…cation of the propensity score implies that E 1 fD t = jg p j (z t ; 0 )jw t = 0 for all j = 1; :::; J:
All J conditional moment restrictions, or a subset of them, can be summarized into a vector. Let D j;t = 1 fD t = d j g ; D t = (D j 1 ;t ; :::; D j k ;t ) and p (z t ; ) = p j 1 (z t ; ) ; :::; p j k (z t ; ) : Set k J and 1 j 1 < ::: < j k J: In our case, we use this setup to focus on d j = f :25; 0; :25g :
must hold. To test this condition, consider the statistic m (D t ; z t ; w t ; ) = (D t p(z t ; )) w t for which the unconditional moment restriction E [m (D t ; z t ; w t ; 0 )] = 0 holds. A test of this restriction is based on the limiting distribution of T 1=2 P T t=1 m (D t ; z t ; w t ; 0 ) under the null-hypothesis of correct speci…cation of p (z t ; 0 ) :
The testing problem is complicated by the fact that 0 is unknown and needs to be estimated. This a¤ects the limiting distribution of the test statistic. De…ne b _ p ( ) = T 1 P T t=1 @p(z t ;^ )=@ 0 w t and
where the second term in# t correctsm t for the e¤ects of parameter estimation. A key insight is that 1 0 See Newey and West (1994, Tables I and II) .
under the null-hypothesis,# t is approximately a martingale di¤erence sequence. This feature signi…cantly simpli…es estimation of the asymptotic variance normalizing the test. Then, letting m = T 1 P T t=1m t andV = T 1 P T t=1# t# 0 t leads to the test statistic
under the null hypothesis that E [1 fD t = jg jz t ] = p j (z t ; 0 ): The limiting distribution in (19) is established in Appendix B.5.
B.4 Regularity Conditions
Let t = [y 0 t ; x 0 t ; D t ] 0 be the vector of observations. Assume that f t g 1 t=1 is strictly stationary with values in the measurable space (R r ; B r ) where B r is the Borel -…eld on R r and r is …xed with 2 r < 1. Let A l 1 = ( 1 ; :::; l ) be the sigma …eld generated by 1 ; :::; l : The sequence t is -mixing or absolutely regular if
Condition 2 Let t be a stationary, absolutely regular sequence such that for some 2 < p < 1 the -mixing coe¢ cient of t satis…es m cm Hall and Heyde (1980) , it also follows that
by Assumption 2 of Newey and West (1994) . Also note that p > 2 is su¢ cient to satisfy Assumption 3 of Newey and West (1994) when the Bartlett kernel is used as suggested here.
The next condition states that the propensity score p(z t ; ) is the correct parametric model for the conditional expectation of D t and lists a number of additional regularity conditions.
Condition 3 Let 0 2 where R k is a compact set and k < 1:
the union of all neighborhoods N ( 0 ) where @p j (z t j )=@ ; @ 2 p j (z t j )=@ i @ j exists and assume that N ( 0 ) is not empty. Assume that for all j 2 f0; :::; Jg and some 0 > 0 and any > 0 ; 0 with 0 < 0 there exists a random variable B t which is a measurable function of D t ; z t and Y t;L and a constant > 0 such that for all i
and ; 0 2 int N ( 0 ). Let h t;j;i ( ) be the i-th element of h t;j ( ) :
Condition 5 Assume that is positive de…nite for all in some neighborhood N such that 0 2 int N and 0 < k k < 1 for all 2 N: Assume that de…ned in (18)is positive de…nite.
Conditions 2, 3 and 4 imply that Assumption 2 of Newey and West is satis…ed. The results of their paper thus apply to the estimates of proposed here.
Regularity conditions for the speci…cation tests are given below.
Condition 6 Let N ( 0 ) be the set de…ned in Condition 3. For some random variable B t which is a measurable function of D t ; z t and w t and for which E [B p t ] < 1; it holds that for some " > 0 and ;
B.5 Proofs Theorem 1 Let^ be de…ned in (9) and assume that Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 hold. Then,
where is de…ned in (18). 
By the Mean Value Theorem we obtain 
By (20) it follows that for 0 given in Condition 3 and any such that 0 > > 0;
P sup
where both terms can be made arbitrarily small by choosing = p and > 0 for T large enough by using Conditions 4 and 3. By McLeish (1975b, Theorem 2.10) 
The …rst term in (25) is o p (1) because from E [z t t;j ( 0 )] = 0 it follows that
For the second term in (25) use Condition 3 to show that
by arguments similar to those in (24). Then, (26) and (27) establish that (25) is o p (1)
It then follows from (25) and (27) that (22) is
and v t;j ( 0 ) is the j-th element of v t ( 0 ) : Note that v t;j ( 0 ) is -mixing with E [v t;j ( 0 )] = 0. Then it follows that
by stationarity of v t ( 0 ) and the Toeplitz lemma. Fix 2 R k with k k = 1 and let
Then, E S 2 T ! 0 > 0 by (28) and Condition 5. In addition
The result now follows from the Cramer-Wold theorem.
Theorem 2 Let^ be de…ned in (11) and assume that Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 hold. Let _ ( ) = @ ( ) =@ 0 and assume that _ ( 0 ) A has full column rank. In addition, assume that 0 ( ) = 0 if and only if = 0 where 0 2 A R d and A is compact. Then,
where is de…ned in (18): For any 2 R d such that A 0 6 = 0 it follows that
Proof. Let
By the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that T 1 P T t=1ĥ t ! p : Thus, uniformly in 2 A; 
where k~ 0 k k^ 0 k ! p 0: Then, by the continuous mapping theorem, it follows that @ (^ ) =@ 0 ! p _ ( 0 ) and @ (~ ) =@ 0 ! p _ ( 0 ) : By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that
The result then follows directly from rearranging (30) and applying the continuous mapping theorem.
To prove the second part of the theorem use a mean value expansion around 0
The result then follows from the continuous mapping theorem, noting
The following theorem establishes the limiting distribution of the test statistic in (19).
Theorem 3 Assume that Conditions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 hold. Let V t = # t # 0 t V where # t is de…ned in (31). Assume that for any element V t;ij of V t ; E [jV t;ij j p ] < 1: Then,
Proof. Let P (z t ; ) = diag (p(z t ; )) ; h(z t ; ) = diag (p(z t ; )) p(z t ; )p (z t ; ) 0 . Simple algebra then shows that
where`(D t ; z t ; ) = P J j=0 D j;t log p j (z t ; ) is the log likelihood of the multinomial distribution and D j;t = 1 fD t = d j g :
w t such that for m t;0 = m (D t ; z t ; w t ; 0 ) ; 
where the last line follows from E @p(z t ; 0 )=@
is a martingale di¤erence sequence we consider
By Corollary 3.9 of McLeish (1975a) it follows that
A detailed veri…cation of the conditions is omitted but follows the same line of argument as given in the proof of Theorem 1 above. To estimate V; de…nê
By arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that
and
Next, expand#
and recalling
where the second term on the RHS of (35) is o p (1) by Theorem 2.10 of McLeish (1995b) . Next, consider
Thus,
For R 1 note that
by Condition 6 and by Theorem 2.10 of McLeish (1975b) . 11 The second term in (39) can be bounded with probability approaching 1 as T ! 1, using Condition 6(iii), and noting that
by McLeish (1975b) . Now (40) and (41) 
For R 2 note that using Condition 6(ii), w.p.a.1 as T ! 1; (33), (34) and (42) 
For R 3 note that
in (36) can be analyzed in the same way as T 1 P T t=1 # t # t # t 0 but the details are omitted.
It follows that
Then, for m = T 1 P T t=1m t ; the statistic T m 0V 1 m is asymptotically 2 J because of (32), (43) and the continuous mapping theorem. Table 1 . The …gure also shows IP growth over the same period. Table 1 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands. Table 1 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands. Table  1 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands. Table 3 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands. Table 3 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands. Table 3 . Dashed lines indicate 90% con…dence bands.
